Pinkwashing Pachamama in the Pinktide will draw on a number of sources, especially
- The New Extractivism of the 21st Century: Ten Urgent Theses about Extractivism in Relation to Current South American Progressivism, Eduardo Gudynas, January 21, 2010
- The New Developmental Extractivism in South America, Ricardo Verdum | January 19, 2010
- What’s left in Latin America?: regime change in new times

”The New Extractivism of the 21st Century: Ten Urgent Theses about Extractivism in Relation to Current South American Progressivism”
Eduardo Gudynas, Americas Program Report (Washington, DC: Center for International Policy, January 21, 2010).
The recognition of the unique identity of this progressive style of extractivism requires a rigorous and measured approach. It is important to understand that neo-extractivism cannot be understood as a neoliberal strategy similar to those seen in previous decades, but neither can it be interpreted as a promising alternative, which automatically improves the quality of life and citizen autonomy.
It is evident that present progressivism offers in many cases substantial improvements over conservative regimes; the regime of Rafael Correa, for example, is not the same as that of Alan García.
But as is left clear in the present essay that limitations, resistances, and contradictions persist, and therefore one can’t analyze the present South American Left with the old paradigms.
Neo-extractivism is not a retreat to the past obsession with the market, but neither does it exemplify a socialist paradise, since many tensions and contradictions persist.
To ignore the impacts of neo-extractivism or to silence the analyses out of partisan sympathy is an unwise road to take, especially in academic and militant social settings.
To take advantage of this lack of clarity is to reject insidiously all the actions of the governing Left and to follow another mistaken path.
It is true that under neo-extractivism many impacts persist, especially social and environmental aspects. But in spite of this, it can’t be maintained that this represents in reality a neoliberalism or a “savage capitalism,” as for example García-Gaudilla (2009) maintained Chavismo in Venezuela is.
1. The importance of extractivist sectors as a relevant pillar of the styles of development: in spite of the profound political shift to the Left on the South American continent, the extractivist sectors maintain their importance and are one of the pillars of the strategies of present development in all the countries, from Hugo Chavez’s Venezuela to the moderate Lula de Silva’s Brazil.
2. South American progressivism is generating a new type of extractivism, as much because of its components as because of the combination of old and new attributes: a new style of extractivism has developed, bearing a progressive stamp. It is important to recognize this fact in order to avoid falling into one of two extremes which would result in an inadequate analysis.
On the one hand, one cannot maintain that the governments of the Left haven’t done anything and that the systems of management of sectors like mining and petroleum are the same as they were in 1980s or 1990s.
But on the other hand, neither can one defend a hopeful position which would suggest that these new governments have substantially modified the extractive sector, and that they are ameliorating their social and environmental impacts through a transition to another kind of development which does not depend on the exportation of primary materials such as copper and petroleum.
3. The state is seen to have a larger presence and a more active role, with both direct and indirect actions: In neo-extractivism, the state is much more active, with rules that are much clearer (regardless of whether they are good or not), and not necessarily oriented to serve “friends” of political power. In some cases, the new governments renegotiated contracts, increased taxes, and boosted the role of state businesses.
Conceivably it was in Bolivia that there were substantial changes, since by 2006 the administration of Evo Morales had imposed the renegotiation of contracts with petroleum businesses, raised taxes 50%, and tried to boost the state petroleum business, YPFB. In Venezuela, the Chavez administration has undone many of the privatization measures of previous governments which led to private enterprises holding a majority share of PDVSA (the state petroleum firm), and private companies having ties with state businesses in other countries (like China, India, and Russia). Ecuador is following the same route.
For example, the Correa government has adjusted the tax system and has thrown out new petroleum contracts. In Brazil, a new regulatory system for the sector is being discussed, including the idea of creating a new kind of state agency to handle petroleum resources.
4. Neo-extractivism serves a subordinate and functional role in inserting itself into commercial and financial globalization: neo-extractivism is functional for commercial globalization—it will finance and maintain the international subordination of South America.
Meanwhile, extractivism for export advances, as much in classic products provided by mining and petroleum as in the new type of agriculture and forestry. For example, the exports provided by mining and quarrying in the countries of the enlarged Mercosur (Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay, and Uruguay), increased from 20 billion dollars in 2004 to more than 46 billion in 2007 (CEPAL, 2009)
5. Territorial fragmentation continues to advance, with relegated areas and extractive enclaves associated with global markets: territorial fragmentation in deterritorialized areas persists under the new extractivism, generating a network of enclaves and their connections to global markets which exacerbate territorial tensions. The territorial configuration, the participating actors, and their forms of relationship and institutions are modified resulting in the disintegration of communities. (Bebbington and Hinojosa Valencia, 2007).
6. Beyond the ownership of resources, rules and the functioning of productive processes are displaced by competition, efficiency, maximization of profits, and externalization of impacts: under progressive governments it is especially important to recognize that, except for the ownership of the resources, the rules and functions of productive processes oriented to enhance competition, increase profits according to classic criteria of efficiency including the externalization of social and environmental impacts, are repeated.
Not only that, the true state capacity is debatable because of the contracts of association, societies, or “joint ventures” with private corporations which generate a privatization in fact of the productive processes, as is happening at the moment in Bolivia.
7. Social and environmental impacts in extractive sectors continue, and in some cases have been aggravated: that neo-extractivism is perpetuated, and in some cases, its social and environmental impacts have increased, and that actions to confront them and to deal with them are still ineffective and even, on occasion have been weakened.
Under the progressive governments the debate over social, environmental, and territorial effects is more opaque. Regarding environmental concerns on various occasions their very existence has been denied or minimized, and in other cases environmental effects of extractivism have not only been denied but also presented as different kinds of issues, for example, as struggles over economic interests, as confrontations in matters of territorial planning, or expressions of hidden agendas of political parties (see for example the cases in Argentina in Svampa and Antonelli, 2009 and Rodríguez Pardo, 2009). But these impacts have been presented as impacts that ought to be accepted as “sacrifices” for the greater benefit of the whole nation. For example, in Chavez’s Venezuela, it should be accepted that the state of Zulia has been converted into a “zone of sacrifice for petroleum exploration” (García-Gaudilla, 2009).
Regarding the social dimension, social conflicts unleashed by extractivism exist in all the countries under progressive governments: there is opposition to mining and denunciation of petroleum contamination in Venezuela, Ecuador, and Bolivia; there are protests against mining exploitation in Argentina and Chile; there are denunciations of the monoculture of soy and forest products in Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, and Uruguay, etc. The governments reject these protests, refusing to recognize their causes, or minimizing them. Sometimes protest leaders are accused of harboring other interests, and furthermore, there is no lack of people claiming that they accept these impacts in exchange for the greater good of the whole nation. On the other hand, indigenous groups and campesinos are attacked with accusations of “impeding” development and “generating damages throughout the country”(Bebbington, 2009).
Even in countries which supposedly enjoyed the tranquility of not having such conflicts, a close examination shows another picture. For example, in Brazil, during Lula da Silva’s first term, rural conflicts increased substantially, and if they have fallen off in the second term, they nonetheless continue at a high rate (Fig. 2). This is owing to factors such as bad working conditions, slave labor, and violence against indigenous people, all of which occur especially in the Amazon, much of which is tied directly to neo-extractivism
8. The state captures (or tries to capture) a greater proportion of the surplus generated by the extractive sectors, and a part of these resources finances social programs, with which the state gains new sources of social legitimization: the state captures a bigger portion of the surplus, a part of which is destined for social programs which generate legitimacy, as much for the governments as for the extractivist industries, and this contributes to the pacification of local social demands.
Progressive social programs, like those enumerated above, include activities which, among other things, compensate for some of the negative consequences of extractivist strategies that these same governments encourage and promote. They moderate social demands and calm social protest. In the case of Brazil, evidence is already accumulating documenting these effects. De Oliveira (2009) demonstrates the paradoxical situation where, although the Lula government abandoned the goals of agricultural reform, the number of people involved in protests is falling. In his analysis, this “ebbing of mass movements and the flow of government financial resources channeled for the purpose of compensation policies (packages of aid of all kinds and styles, etc.), is pacifying those who fought strongly for agricultural reform over the last 30 years. Everything indicates that these two processes are interwoven” (de Oliveira, 2009).
9. There are some contradictions inherent in extractionism that have come to be seen as indispensable for combating poverty and promoting development: neo-extractivism is accepted as one of the fundamental motors of economic growth and a key contributor to the battle against poverty on a national scale. It is assumed that part of this growth will generate benefits which will fall to the rest of society (”drip” or “trickle”). The state, now more dominant, should encourage and guide this outpouring.
One of the implications of this logic is that this reductionist vision is not questioned, rather its equation of economic growth with development is accepted, and thus, at least for now, an alternative vision for development has not been generated. Although Bolivian and Ecuadorian discussions about the “good life” have this potential, the governments and many other social actors appear to steer toward instrumental issues. In the Bolivian case, the situation is still more tense owing to the fact that, surprisingly, the new constitution indicates in various articles that one of the purposes of the state is the “industrialization” of natural resources.
10. Neo-extractivism is a part of South America’s own contemporary version of development, which maintains the myth of progress under a new hybridization of culture and politics. Neo-extractivism is a new ingredient in the contemporary South American version of development. This version is heir to the classical ideas of modernity, and as such it keeps its faith with material progress, but it is a contemporary hybrid which results from the cultural political conditions unique to South America.
Progressivism would represent a form of nationalism regarding recourses, according to the words of Bebbington (2009), where extraction is not itself questioned, but rather whether or not it is under private and foreign control. These governments move to take state control over these resources, although they end up reproducing the same productive processes, similar relations of power, and the same social and environmental impacts.
Published by the Americas Program. Copyright © Creative Commons - some rights reserved.
Recommended citation:
Eduardo Gudynas, “The New Extractivism of the 21st Century: Ten Urgent Theses about Extractivism in Relation to Current South American Progressivism,” Americas Program Report (Washington, DC: Center for International Policy, January 21, 2010).
Web location:
http://americas.irc-online.org/am/6653
Production Information:
Author(s): Eduardo Gudynas
Translator(s): Esther Buddenhagen
Editor(s): Michael Collins
Production: Chellee Chase-Saiz
